This etext was produced by David Widger
[NOTE: There is a short list of bookmarks, at the end of several of thefiles for those who may wish to sample the author's ideas before makingan entire meal of them. D.W.]
By LOUIS ANTOINE FAUVELET DE BOURRIENNE
His Private Secretary
Edited by R. W. Phipps
Colonel, Late Royal Artillery
1891
CONTENTS:
CHAPTER XIX. to CHAPTER XXVI. 1803-1804
1803.
Mr. Pitt—Motive of his going out of office—Error of the English
Government—Pretended regard for the Bourbons—Violation of the
treaty of Amiens—Reciprocal accusations—Malta—Lord Whitworth's
departure—Rome and Carthage—Secret satisfaction of Bonaparte—
Message to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate—
The King of England's renunciation of the title of King of France—
Complaints of the English Government—French agents in British ports
—Views of France upon Turkey—Observation made by Bonaparte to the
Legislative Body—Its false interpretation—Conquest of Hanover—
The Duke of Cambridge caricatured—The King of England and the
Elector of Hanover—First address to the clergy—Use of the word
"Monsieur"—The Republican weeks and months.
One of the circumstances which foretold the brief duration of the peaceof Amiens was, that Mr. Pitt was out of office at the time of itsconclusion. I mentioned this to Bonaparte, and I immediately perceivedby his hasty "What do you say?" that my observation had been heard—butnot liked. It did not, however, require any extraordinary shrewdness tosee the true motive of Mr. Pitt's retirement. That distinguishedstatesman conceived that a truce under the name of a peace wasindispensable for England; but, intending to resume the war with Francemore fiercely than ever, he for a while retired from office, and left toothers the task of arranging the peace; but his intention was to mark hisreturn to the ministry by the renewal of the implacable hatred he hadvowed against France. Still, I have always thought that the conclusionof peace, however necessary to England, was an error of the Cabinet ofLondon. England alone had never before acknowledged any of thegovernments which had risen up in France since the Revolution; and as thepast could not be blotted out, a future war, however successful toEngland, could not take from Bonaparte's Government the immense weight ithad acquired by an interval of peace. Besides, by the mere fact of theconclusion of the treaty England proved to all Europe that therestoration of the Bourbons was merely a pretext, and she defaced thatpage of her history which might have shown that she was actuated bynobler and more generous sentiments than mere hatred of France. It isvery certain that the condescension of England in treating with the FirstConsul had the effect of rallying round him a great many partisans of theBourbons, whose hopes entirely depended on the continuance of war betweenGreat Britain and France. This opened the eyes of the greater number,namely, those who could not see below the surface, and were notpreviously aware that the demonstrations of friendship so liberally madeto the Bourbons by the European Cabinets, and especially by England, weremerely false pretences, assumed for the purpose of disguising, beneaththe semblance of honourable motives, their wish to injure France, and tooppose her rapidly increasing power.