CHALLENGING HIS RIGHT—AND THAT OF ALL THEOTHER SO-CALLED SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVESIN CONGRESS—
TO EXERCISE ANY LEGISLATIVE POWER WHATEVEROVER THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.
BOSTON, MASS.:
PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR.
1882.
[62]
"Challenging his right—and that of all the other so-calledsenators and representatives in Congress—to exercise anylegislative power whatever over the people of the UnitedStates."
by Lysander Spooner
To Thomas F. Bayard, of Delaware:
Sir—I have read your letter to Rev. Lyman Abbott, in which youexpress the opinion that it is at least possible for a man to be alegislator (under the Constitution of the United States) and yet bean honest man.
This proposition implies that you hold it to be at least possiblethat some four hundred men should, by some process or other,become invested with the right to make laws of their own—that is,laws wholly of their own device, and therefore necessarily distinctfrom the law of nature, or the principles of natural justice; and thatthese laws of their own making shall be really and truly obligatoryupon the people of the United States; and that, therefore, the peoplemay rightfully be compelled to obey them.
All this implies that you are of the opinion that the Congress ofthe United States, of which you are a member, has, by some processor other, become possessed of some right of arbitrary dominionover the people of the United States; which right of arbitrarydominion is not given by, and is, therefore, necessarily in conflictwith, the law of nature, the principles of natural justice, and thenatural rights of men, as individuals. All this is necessarily impliedin the idea that the Congress now possesses any right whatever tomake any laws whatever, of its own device—that is, any laws thatshall be either more, less, or other than that natural law, which itcan neither make, unmake, nor alter—and cause them to be enforcedupon the people of the United States, or any of them, againsttheir will.[63]
You assume that the right of arbitrary dominion—that is, theright of making laws of their own device, and compelling obedienceto them—is a "trust" that has been delegated to those who nowexercise that power. You call it "the trust of public power."
But, Sir, you are mistaken in supposing that any such power hasever been delegated, or ever can be delegated, by any body, to anybody.
Any such delegation of power is naturally impossible, for thesereasons, viz:
1. No man can delegate, or give to another, any right of arbitrarydominion over himself; for that would be giving himself away as aslave. And this no one can do. Any contract to do so is necessarilyan absurd one, and has no validity. To call such a contract a "constitution,"or by any other high-sounding name, does not alter itscharacter as an absurd and void contract.
2. No man can delegate, or give to another, any right of arbitrarydominion over a third person; for that would imply a right in thefirst person, not only to make the third person his slave, but alsoa right to dispose of him as a slave to still other persons. Any contractto do this is necessarily a criminal one, and therefore invalid.To call such a contract a "constitution" does not at all lessen itscriminality, or add to its validity.
These facts, that no man can delegate, or give away, his ownnatural right to liberty, nor